In this paper, we study the relationship between efficient and optimal allocations in a Chamberlinian framework.
Introduction Since the publication of Chamberlin's book [The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1933)], there has been sorne controversy about what is implied by adopting the Monopolistic Competition point of view [see for example
vs. Samuelson (1958) ].
The first formal model of Monopolistic Competition is due to Spence (1976) . He showed that if the utility function of the sole consumer is of the form u = v(¿i; 1 xi) +1, being x¡ the consumption of good i and 1 leisure, optimal and equilibrium output coincide and the optimal number of active firms is larger than the equilibrium number. Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) working with a somewhat different model, obtained the same conclusion. AIso they showed that if the utility function is of the form (¿i; 1 V(X¡))b 1
-b
, equilibrium output may be greater, equal or smaller than the optimal output [see also Pettengill (1979) , Dixit-Stiglitz (1979) and Koenker-Perry (1980) ]. Lancaster (1979) and Salop (1979) considered the characteristic approach and the Hotelling model respectively. Finally Sattinger (1984) , Perloff-Salop (1985) and Hart (1985a, b) studied models in which there are many consumers with preferences distributed as random variables, and Anderson-De Palma-Thisse (1987) have shown that under sorne conditions this model is equivalent to the representative consumer model.
In this paper 1 analyze the relationship between Monopolistically Compe-titive Equilibrium and Optimal Allocations in a General Equilibrium model with an infinite number of potentially produced outputs and an outside good. The choice of framework is dictated by the fact that sorne of our results do not need a quasi-linear utility function. The results obtained here extend the analysis of Spence, Oixit and Stiglitz (S-O-S in the sequel) in three different respects. First, I prove sorne new Propositions concerning the location of optimal output on the average cost curve (Proposition 1), the effect on welfare of an increase in the equilibrium number of firms (Proposition 2) and the equilibrium output (Proposition 3), and the relationship between 'excess diversity' and 'excess capacity' (Propositions 4 and 6). It is shown that if the representative consumer likes variety in a sense explained below, average costs must be declining in the optimum. AIso an increase either in the equilibrium output or the number of firms in equilibríum always increases welfare. Moreover excess diversity implies excess capacity but not vice versa. In order to prove these results I only need to assume smoothness of the relevant functions, symmetry of goods in tastes and technology and that the number of firms can be treated as a continuous variable (Proposition 4 and 6 need sorne extra assumptions).
Second, I incorporate (in a limited way) quality choice distinguishing between the name of the product and its specification. One interpretation of this is that quality has two dimensions: one is fixed for each firm, but varíes from firm to firm (as in S-O-S and all other models of a unique consumer) and the other is a decision variable for each firm (as in the characteristics model). The latter can also be interpreted as advertising. Then it is proved that under additional assumptions, optimal and equilibrium qualities coincide (Proposition 5). However, we remark that under alternative specifications of the cost function, [see Yarrow (1985) and IreIand (1987) ] qualities are not optimal.
Third, I prove similar results to those of S-O-S about the relationship between optimal and equilibrium output, but allowing for more general preferences and technology (Propositions 7, 8 and 9) . AIso I provide a graphical setting which shows why these results happen. Finally, Proposition 10 studies the effect on welfare of an increase in output and a reduction in the number of firms in equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the model and the general results. Section 3 considers a more specific model. Finally section 4 presents our final comments.
The rnodel and sorne general results
There are two types of goods. Good O is labor which can be used either as an input or as a consumption good and whose initial endowment is denoted by w. The set of potential1y produced goods (these goods are sometimes referred to as the difTerentiated commodity) is the set of natural numbers. Let us denote by n the number of goods which are efTectively produced.
Firms each produce a unique output. The set of potential firms is also the set of natural numbers. We will assume that firm i produces good i, i.e. no good is produced by two firms. Therefore n is also the number of active firms.
There is asole consumer with preferences representable by a e 2 utility function which is strictIy quasi-concave and increasing in al1 its components. Let k be the vector of qualities (or advertisement) for a typical firm, and x be the output of this firmo If the n -1 remaining firms produce their goods with an identical qualityl q and at an output leve1 y, this utility function can be written as u=u (k,q,n,x,y,l) where 1 is leisure. This function is assumed to be symmetrical such that if x=y and k=q then (n-l)oujox=oujoy and (n-l) VujVk= VujVq (where V denotes vector difTerentiation). Since al1 the al1ocations we will consider are symmetrical there is no loss of generality in representing the choice of al1 active firms except one by a common number (or a vector in the case of qualities).
A
special case of this utility function is a generalized version of the one used by S-D-S namely u=u(v(k) c/>(x)+(n-l)v(q) c/>(y),l).
In the next section we will assume that the utility function has such a form but it is linear on l. In this case, difTerences with S-D-S are the consideration of qualities (since v( ) will afTect the marginal rate of substitution between the difTerentiated commodity and labor) and that the form of u( ) is more general.
Firms produce output from labor (which is assumed to be the numeraire). The technology of the representative firm is represented by a el cost function e = c (x, k) . Similarly for the rest of the firms the cost function is c(y, q), i.e. we assume that the cost function is identical for al1 potential firms.
Final1y we will assume that n can be treated as a continuous variable, i.e. the integer problem is neglected. This may be justified by assuming that optimal and equilibrium values of n are very large, i.e. the Chamberlinian 'large group' assumption.
Let us now introduce two pieces of notation. If the variables x and y (resp. k and q) are bound to vary together so that x = y (resp. k = q) we will denote them by z (resp. a). In other words z (resp. a) is the common output (resp. quality). When no confusion can arise we will use z and a to denote symmetrical al1ocations, Le. those in which x = y and k = q. Also for an arbitrary function y= f(x) we will denote by~the e1asticity of y with respect 1Notice that if two firms produce the same quality it does not imply that these goods are perfect substitutes since these products are intrinsically different. One may think of wine as the differentiated commodity and quality as years in storage. Different firms are located on different kinds of land and their products are different despite of being of the same quality (Le. the same vintage). to x and by e~(x) the elasticity of y with .respect to x as a function of x. Definition 1. (aO, nO, zO, 1°) is said to be a symmetrical optimum if it maximizes u (a,a,n,z,z,1) 
Notice that such an allocation is symmetrical because active firms produce the same quantity of output. In some cases it can be shown [see DixitStiglitz (1977, pp. 300-301) ] that our symmetry assumptions imply that the full optimum -i.e. the allocation which maximize utility over the feasible set -is symmetric. In other cases it may be understood as a kind of restricted optimum, useful as long as it simplifies the analysis.
Defining e~=(oujox+oujoy)zju as the elasticity of utility with respect to common output, and e~=(J7uj17k+ 17uj17q)aju as the elasticity of utility with respect to a common vector of qualities (notice that e~is a vector), both evaluated at a symmetrical allocation, we have that the first order conditions of a symmetrical optimum (assuming this is interior) are
And dividing the first two equations by the third we get
If the utility function is a generalized S-D-S (as explained aboye) then eqs.
(1) and (2) reduce to ek=ei: and e~=e~.
If we have that e~> e~when elasticities are evaluated at some particular allocation we will say that people like variety (at this allocation) in the sense that utility increases faster with the number of brands, holding z as a constant, than with output, holding n as a constant. If the inequality is reversed we will say that people do not like variety (at this allocation). (2) aboye we get the result.
Q.E.D.
Let us now turn to the definition of an equilibrium. The consumer choose the quantities of goods 1, ... , n and leisure in order to maximize utility at given qualities and prices for a given set of available products, i.e. if firm j is not active the consumer is not allowed to demand this brand (in other words the price of j is infinity). The inverse demand function for the representative firm is constructed as follows. Let p (k,q,n,x,y) be the marginal rate of substitution between x and 1 evaluated at l=w-c(k,x)-(n-l)c(q,y), i.e. we assume that the labor market always balance [see Hart (1979, pp. 9-10) ]. Then for the representative firm p=p (k,q,n,x,y) will be the inverse demand function (p being the market price of its product) and profits are p (k, q, n, x, y) x -c(k, x And dividing the first two equations by the third we get
Where e~' (resp. en is the elasticity of oujox with respect to x (resp. k).
Conditions (a) and (b) in Definition 2 aboye, imply that if p( ) is decreasing on x, x
e will be located in the decreasing part of the average cost curve. Therefore Proposition 1 implies that if the average cost is u-shaped with a minimum which does not depend on k and that in the optimum people do not like or are indifferent to variety, then Zo > ze. Next we investigate the effects on utility of small variations on output or the number of firms if, starting from an equilibrium we move to a (very close) feasible allocation.
Proposition 2. An increase in the equilibrium number of firms, holding a e and ze as constant will never decrease welfare.
Proof. First, let us compute oujon evaluated at equilibrium and with 1= w-n e c(ze, a e ). Then using first order conditions of utility maximization and that oujoz=noujox we have that oujon=u(e~-e~)jne.Now we will show that in equilibrium the consumer must like variety and therefore e~~e~. In order to see this let us notice that the optimization performed by the consumer over goods implies that oujox+oujoy=pnoujol. Moreover, since the consumer can always reject an existent variety it must be that ouj on~pzoujol. And the last two equations imply the desired resulto
Q.E.D.
Now let us study the effect on welfare of an increase in output.
Proposition 3. Let us assume that the inverse demand function p( ) is strictly decreasing on x. Then an increase in ze holding a e and n e as constant, always increases welfare.
Proof. Computing oujoz evaluated under the same conditions than in Proposition 2 we have that oujoz=n e oujox(l-(ocjox)jp) and since price exceeds marginal cost the Proposition is proved.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 and 3 imply that the effect on welfare of a simultaneous increase of ze and a reduction of n e is ambiguous. We will see in the next Section that under additional assumptions a full characterization is available (see Proposition 10).
Finally, we investigate the relationship between excess variety and excess capacity. We will assume either that qualities are fixed or that optimal and equilibrium qualities coincide. In the next Section we will study, in a more specific framework, conditions under which the last assumption is justified.
Proposition 4. Let us assume that average costs are non-increasing on [ZO, ze] and that qualitities are fixed. Then n e > nO=zo > ze.
Proof. First notice that the optimal bundle can be written as an ne-dimensional vector (zo, ,zo,O, ... ,O) in which ZO is repeated nO times. Equilibrium prices are (pe, , pe) . Then by revealed preference we have nOpeZO+O+ l0 > nepeze +le. Using the zero profit condition and that w= l+nc(x,a) we get pe=c(ze,a)jze>c(zO,a)jzO where a is a fixed vector of qualities. Then the result follows from our assumption on the average cost curve.
Q.E.D.
Several comments are in order. First notice that only a revealed preference argument was used. Hence, if several consumers are posited but their aggregate demand satisfies this property, Proposition 4 holds. Second, the condition on the average cost curve is true not only when this curve is decreasing everywhere. For instance if this curve were u-shaped, inverse demand function were decreasing on x and people like variety at each possible allocation, this assumption holds since in the optimum and in equilibrium average cost is decreasing with respect to output. Third, a corollary of Proposition 4 is that ze~zO=no > neo This Corollary was hinted by S-D-S in the special case of ze = ZO and for the special class of utility functions described before. Finally, we notice that the converse to Proposition 4 is not true, i.e. excess capacity does not imply excess diversity. For instance under economies of scale demand and cost curves may be such that no entry is profitable by any firm but total surplus associated with a single firm producing at price equals marginal cost is positive. Therefore, at the optimum we have more firms producing more output each than in equilibrium. This shows that we should not infer from the excess capacity theorem the excess diversity theorem, the reverse implication being correct.
Special results
In this section, we assume that utility and cost functions are of the form u=u (v(k) Yarrow (1985) and Ireland (1987) for an alternative specification of c( )].
Notice that c( )'s form implies that e,,=ef and e"=e'.
We will also assume sorne kind of 'large group' assumption. Defining s == ncjJ(z) v(a) (s can be thought of as an aggregate measure of the quantity consumed of the differentiated commodity), the inverse demand function reads p = 8uj8sv(k) 8cjJ(x)j8x. Then we assume that firms regard s as constant with respect to x and k [see Spence (1976, p. 127, eq. 52 and footnote 11) and Dixit-Stiglitz (1977, p. 299, eqs. 8-9) ], [see Tirole (1989, p. 288) and Costrell (1989) for alternative motivations of this assumption]. Then, it is easy to show that e~' =e~', e k ' = el;, e~=el;e~and e~=e~e~where e~' is the elasticity of oljJ/ox with respect to x. Then, we have the following Proposition 5. Under the above speclfzcation, if optimal and equilibrium qualities are unique, then aO = a e .
Proof. In our case, optimal qualities satisfy e¡;(aO) =ef(aO) where we have made explicit the dependence of elasticities with respect to their arguments. AIso equilibrium qualities solve ek(a e )= ef(a e ).
For the rest of the paper we will assume, w.l.o.g., that v(a e ) = F(a e )= 1.
2
Next we investigate the relationship between SO and Se. This relationship can also be used to obtain a result similar to that of Proposition 4 but under different assumptions. 
Proof. Let us prove part (a). From the definition of an optimum we get u(sO)-u(se»no f(zO)-n e f(ze).
AIso we have f(zO)no=so ou(SO)/os (from the first order condition of welfare maximization with respect to n) and f(ze) n e = se e~ou(se)/os (from the zero profit condition). Therefore, we obtain u(sO)-u(se»sOou(s°)/os-e~(ze)seou(se)/os.Now it is easy to show that if F(y), F: R+-.R+ is an arbitrary function with F(O) =O and o2F/oy2<O, e:(y) <1. Then by rearranging we obtain u(sO)(1-e~(sO))>u(se)(l-e~(se)). Therefore if se~SO we reach a contradiction, Part (b) is now easily obtained from part (a).
Q.E.D.
Notice that our assumption on u(s) covers the case of a generalized C.E.S. function u=(ncjJ(zW, a< 1. Next, the relationship between ZO and ze will be studied. We assume that the slope of e{(x) is greater than the slope of e~ (x) for all x. This implies that the optimum is unique and that the second order condition of welfare maximization with respect to output holds. With respect to ljJ(x) we will assume either that (a) e~( ) is decreasing on x or (b) e~( ) is 2The fact that under imperfect competition qualities may be optimal was first discovered by Swan under conditions stronger than ours [see Tirole (1989, p. 102) The equations we will use are e~(zO) = e~(zO), 1+enz e )= e~(ze) [they follow from (2) and (3) in our case] and that iJe~(z)/iJx>(resp.=or <) 0-1 + e~'(z»(resp.=or <) e~(z) where the last equation is found by simple differentiation. These equations can be used in figs. 1, 2 and 3 to locate both the optimal and the equilibrium output. Each case (a), (b) and (c) aboye yields a different relationship between optimal and equilibrium output. Formal proofs of these Propositions are obtainable under request from the author. fig. 3 ).
Propositions 7 and 8 were proyed by Dixit-Stiglitz (1977, eq. 50, p. 304 ) assuming constant elasticity of u( ) on s and constant marginal costs. Proposition 9 was proyed by Spence (1976, p. 231, Proposition 6) and . Finally, we study the effect on welfare of a simultaneous yariation of ze and neo Proof. We easily eompute ou(ze,ze, (w-n/f(ze),le)/oz=(et-eC)(u/ze)e~= (et -e~' -1)(u/z) e~and henee the result.
In the ease (a) aboye ZO > ze and welfare inereases with a (small) inerease of ze eoupled with a reduetion of neo Converse1y in the ease (b) aboye ze>zO (and if the assumptions quoted on Corollary 1 or Proposition 6 hold, also n e > nO) and welfare inereases with a reduetion in equilibrium output and an inerease in variety. Finally if (e) holds then ZO = ze and a small inerease in ze has no etTeet on welfare (enve1ope theorem).
Final comments
(1) We first notiee that the methods developed in the previous seetion ean z be applied to prove Propositions 5 and 7-9 in more general cases. For instance, several consumers may be allowed to be present if each of them consumes a particular bundle of the differentiated commodity, and if this bundle is consumed only by this consumero AIso, many classes of differentiated commodities can be assumed.
(2) An implication of our analysis is that under Monopolistic Competition there is voluntary unemployment in the following sense: welfare can be increased by increasing either the number of firms (Proposition 2) or output (Proposition 3). In both cases leisure must decrease in order to maintain a balance in the labor market. Therefore a decrease in leisure increases welfare and hence the result.
(3) Finally, our analysis can be summarized as follows. Under rather general assumptions, (1) Optimal output is located on the decreasing part of the average cost curve if and only if the representative consumer likes variety, (2) welfare increases with respect to output and the number of firms in equilibrium and (3) excess variety implies excess capacity but not vice versa. In a more specific framework, which however generalizes S-D-S analysis, (4) equilibrium and optimal qualities coincide, (5) optimal output can be greater, equal or less than equilibrium output and (6) welfare can be increased by reducing the difference between optimal and equilibrium output.
